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Abstract
The world is suffering from an extreme global water crisis. 1.1 billion people in
the world lack access to adequate clean water, and 2.6 billion people lack access to
water and sanitation. Approximately 10 million deaths per year can be attributed to this
water crisis; water-borne infectious diseases play a significant role in this death toll.
Diarrhoeal disease accounts for 2.6 million deaths per year and is one of the leading
causes of death in many developing countries.
We are entering a period of undeniable climate change which is bringing about
more natural disasters and extreme weather events than ever before, and unfortunately
these catastrophes significantly exacerbate the already dire global water crisis. It is now
more than ever important to understand the complexities of the relationship between
water and health. Lack of access to water and sanitation, and infectious diseases
severely detract from the quality of life and impede the progress of the developing
world. Further, as Hurricane Katrina reminded us in 2005, natural disasters know no
national borders or socioeconomic status. We cannot ignore the effect that natural
disasters across the world have on water and sanitation systems, especially those
across the world that are already sorely lacking, and the resulting burden of disease,
and what comprises the response and rebuilding process.
The results of this research highlight the dire need for improved methods of
disaster prevention, preparedness, and response. There are many disaster-prone areas
of the world that are very ill-prepared to handle these natural disasters when they occur.
They lack the physical infrastructure to withstand the disasters, the human and financial
resources to mitigate the effects after the disasters, or both. A comparison of the recent
natural disasters in both New Orleans and Haiti demonstrates the successes and
failures of disaster preparedness and response in both the developed and the
developing world. It is absolutely vital to learn to adapt our world to understand to be
better prepared for such disasters to mitigate the effects on water systems, and the
health of the public overall.
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Introduction
In a time when population is increasing faster than ever (“World Population
Growth”, 2004) and climate change is causing natural disasters more often and more
extreme than ever before (Greer et al, 2004), it is now more than ever important to
understand the complexities of the relationship between water and health. Lack of
access to water and sanitation, and the prevalence of infectious disease severely
detract from the quality of life and impede the progress of the developing world. Even
the industrialized world, as we know it today, struggled with principles of sanitation and
water systems for centuries, keeping them from reaching the modern definitions of
development. With the natural disasters of the all-to-recent past, such as Hurricane
Katrina and the earthquake in Haiti these fragile water and sanitation systems are even
further compromised. Additionally, as Katrina reminded us in 2005, natural disasters
know no national borders or socioeconomic status. We cannot ignore the effect that
natural disasters across the world have on water and sanitation systems and the
resulting burden of disease. Though efforts are underway worldwide to impede the
progress of climate change, we cannot afford to be unprepared for the change and
disasters it is already bringing. With an examination of the world-wide water situation
and the resulting burden of water-related diseases and specific exploration of this
burden of disease and methods of response in both New Orleans and Haiti before and
after their respective natural disasters, the implications for prevention and response
practices for the future are apparent: It is vital to learn to adapt our world to understand
to be better prepared for such disasters
Across the developing world, independent of the catastrophic interruptions of
natural disasters, the water and sanitation situation is severely impeding development
(Human Development Report, 2006). Even now, in the 21st century, the lack of clean
water and a toilet is one of the leading causes of death for children all over the world
(Human Development Report, 2006). Approximately 1.1 billion people, or one fifth of the
developing world lack access to clean water, and 2.6 billion, or almost half of the
developing world, lack access to sanitation. Further, for another 1.8 million people in the
developing world that fall under this umbrella of “having access to clean water”, this
term still only signifies that they live within one kilometer of the closest safe water
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source (Human Development Report, 2006). For such individuals, the World Health
Organization (WHO) places the water poverty threshold at 50 liters per person per day,
with the absolute minimum water intake for drinking and basic personal hygiene at 20
liters per day. The averages for most developing countries rest below this water poverty
threshold, with several even falling below the absolute minimum (Human Development
Report, 2006). Most countries in the developing world provide clean water for less than
70% of their citizens, with coverage rates averaging between 50-60% and dropping as
low as 22% in Ethiopia (Human Development Report, 2006). The sanitation situation is,
if possible, even more disturbing, with the majority of developing countries providing
safe sanitation for fewer than half of their citizens (Human Development Report, 2006).
Finally, 10 million deaths per year can be attributed to unsafe water consumption, poor
sanitation, and insufficient hygiene (Viladent, 2010). Clearly, the water and sanitation
situation of the developing world is already fragile enough without any outside
interference.
In contrast, the day-to-day water and sanitation problems of the developed world
were largely solved by the beginning of the 20th century. Countries such as the United
States can boast 100% coverage for both access to an improved water source and
sanitation (WHO “Coverage Estimates”, 2006). Further, developed nations use
upwards of 300 liters of water per person per day, with the United States coming in on
top with an average of more than 600 liters per person per day (Human Development
Report, 2006). This contrast is staggering, and throws into even sharper focus the
severity of this world-wide situation.
Clearly, with 10 million water related deaths per year, there is a plethora of
effects that water has on both the health of an individual and the community; most
compromised by natural disasters is the burden of water-related diseases. There are
several classifications of such diseases. Waterborne diseases are infections spread
through a contaminated water supply; water-washed diseases are infections spread
through lack of water for personal hygiene; water-vectored diseases are infections
spread by insects who rely on water for some part of their life cycle; and water-based
diseases, infections spread by an aquatic invertebrate host (Viladent, 2010). According
to the WHO, many water-related diseases must be regarded as a top priority post-
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disaster in order to reduce the impact following natural disasters and improve the health
status of populations that are continuously disaster-affected (Watson et al, 2006).
Diarrhoeal diseases, responsible for 2.6 million deaths world wide each year, are the
most deadly (Human Development Report, 2006). Maladies such as norovirus,
rotavirus, salmonella, shigella, campylobacter, giardia, cholera, E. coli, Hepatitis A and
E, and leptospirosis are considered to be at the highest risk after natural disasters.
Such diseases have been confirmed in both developing and developed nations after
disasters (Watson et al, 2006). Although “the overall risk of communicable disease
outbreaks is lower than often perceived”, the risk of transmission does increase
following natural disasters and it is vital to be prepared to handle such risks to prevent
an even deadlier disaster (Watson et al, 2006).
In reality, the actual level of risk post-disaster is very dependent on the individual
population; the size of the population, the degree of displacement, and the range of
diseases already epidemic or endemic in a certain community all affect the level of risk.
It is not the disaster alone that triggers such epidemics and outbreaks (Watson et al,
2007). Developing nations are inordinately affected due to these reasons and the
general lack of resources, infrastructure, and disaster preparedness (Watson et al,
2006). However, natural disasters are not confined within the borders of developing
nations. There are many disaster-prone regions found in the developed world, and
despite a stronger infrastructure and more abundant resources, disaster preparedness
can still be sorely lacking. Even today, natural disasters in both the developed and the
developing world have absolutely devastating and catastrophic results, though the
developed world is often disproportionately affected.
The major cause behind these catastrophic results is not the disaster itself - it is
the lack of preparedness to prevent or respond. The lesson throughout history, when it
comes to investment in prevention, has continuously been the same: either pay now, or
pay a lot more later. However, though some areas of the world have taken this lesson
to heart, there are many disaster prone regions that still remain vulnerable to utter
devastation. Professor Robert Bea, discussing his theory on Prudent Investment in
Prevention (PIP), said “Investments in prevention require a long-term view of the future.
The American public generally seems to be focused on the short-term view.” He cites
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the major reasons for this being the political process, which encourages this view due to
the short re-election cycles, and the commercial-industrial process, which encourages
this view due to stockholder requirements for immediate growth and return on
investments (Bea, 2010). This mentality needs to change to provide better protection to
disaster prone regions all over America and the world. According to his mathematical
formula for PIP to justify in which methods one should invest, only the areas that have
the possibility to be adequately protected should be protected (See Appendices I and
V). However, throughout history, the public tries to do too much, too inefficiently, and
too impractically (Bea, 2010).
This short-term view is not restricted to the American public; with few exceptions,
this is the view held by most disaster-prone areas across the world. A juxtaposition of
two of the most devastating natural disasters in the recent past clearly demonstrates the
this short-term blindness and the ignorance of national borders and socioeconomic
status of natural disasters, and a comparison of the resulting burdens of disease sheds
light on the pros, cons and disparities of disaster preparedness and response methods.
Though often natural disasters can be impossible to predict, we are fully aware of many
disaster prone areas of the world, and the concept of disaster epidemiology, introduced
in 1976, states: “Death rates, according to type of disaster, and attack rates for various
types of disorder in survivors could be computed and these indices used in planning
appropriate supplies for rescue and relief” (Michel, 1976). Hurricane Katrina in 2005
and the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 both absolutely devastated their respective
communities. However, both are located in very disaster-prone areas of the world; this
knowledge and the concept of disaster epidemiology should have given them the
opportunity to be somewhat prepared to handle the natural disasters Mother Nature
brings upon them. Now, these areas must revise their methods of disaster response
and preparedness to mitigate future consequences, and the rest of the disaster prone
regions of the world must use these experiences to better prepare themselves. As
Professor Robert Bea put it so eloquently: “There are no such things as Natural
Disasters. There are natural hazards. There is human hubris. When we combine natural
hazards with human hubris, we have disasters. When we combine disasters with more
human hubris, we have catastrophes” (Bea, 2006).
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Methodology
To conduct this research, I used a variety of sources in order to gather the most
complete and comprehensive data possible. I began with a broad overview of the
importance of water to public health. I then examined the water infrastructure and
burden of disease before the natural disasters in New Orleans and Haiti, the destruction
of infrastructure and the resulting change in the trends of the burden of disease. I
additionally examined the responses to each disaster and how each responses focuses
on the water catastrophe. For my study on Hurricane Katrina, I primarily made use of
journal articles based on studies done in the months and years after the Hurricane. I
also used Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports (MMWR) published weekly by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) from the weeks following the
hurricane to evaluate the change in the burden of disease. I also used many resources
from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), and the United
States Army Corps of Engineers (US ACE), and the CDC to evaluate the response to
the hurricane. For my study on the earthquake in Haiti, as it is a much more recent
event in a much less developed country, there were very few journal articles on which to
call. However, using news articles in the weeks and months after the earthquake from
internationally respected sources, such as CNN, BBC, and Reuters, I was able to gain
an equivalent understanding. Additionally, the World Health Organization (WHO),
specifically the Pan American branch (PAHO), and other international relief
organizations have published briefings on their work and the results in the Haiti
earthquake relief effort. Finally, to gain a deeper understanding of the complexities of
disaster response, preparedness, and prevention, I conducted two interviews, despite
many unanswered efforts to make contacts with other professionals. The first interview
was with Mr John Coo, the head of Green Cross Canada, who is trying to set in motion
a disaster preparedness effort by Green Cross International. Specifically, he is working
on a bio-sand water filter initiative as both a response in Haiti to the water crisis and as
a semi-permanent solution as well. The second interview was with Professor Robert
Bea of the University of California at Berkeley, who was the head of the definitive report
post-Katrina on the levee system failure of New Orleans, and who has many expert
opinions on how New Orleans can improve their disaster preparedness and response.
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Discussion and Results
New Orleans: Hurricane Katrina, 2005
Hurricane Katrina was the costliest and one of the top five deadliest hurricanes in
the history of the United States and, according to the National Hurricane Center in 2006,
the most devastating natural disaster in United States history (Knabb et al, 2006). It
was the deadliest hurricane since 1928, with the final death toll unknown due to the
hundreds of persons who remain missing after the storm. A minimum of 1,836 lives
were lost in the actual hurricane and subsequent floods, with 450,000 displaced, for
anywhere from a few days to a few weeks, and over 200,000 who never returned to
their city (Seed, et al, 2006). According to one doctor who responded to the crisis, “New
Orleans became a developing country after Katrina hit... there was water everywhere,
but you could not possibly dip your hand in it and drink it because it was mixed with
sewage” (Khan, 2009). The truth of this statement becomes apparent when compared
with the status of the United States in general before Katrina. Infectious diseases,
including waterborne infectious diseases, do not appear in the top fifteen causes of
death over the last several decades (Xu, 2010). From 1991 to 2002, there has been an
annual average of approximately 17 clusters of waterborne disease outbreaks
(WBDOs), comprising about 10,000 cases of disease, with a median of 6 deaths per
year, representing a negligible percentage of the annual deaths in the United States.
The most common diseases from this time period include unidentified acute
gastroenteritis (AGI), giardiasis, norovirus, E. coli, and shigellosis (CDC “Surveillance”,
2006). In other words, waterborne infectious diseases are no longer an issue that
significantly contributes to the burden of disease in the United States. The population is
not immune to the possibility of such an outbreak, but the sanitation and water coverage
is widespread enough that they no longer pose a significant threat to the public health.
By and large, waterborne infectious diseases are no longer a major public health
concern in the United States.
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Disaster
Nevertheless, in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, waterborne
infectious diseases became just that. Countless news articles in the immediate
aftermath of the August 29, 2005 hurricane cite the concerns of significant, deadly
WBDOs. Further, the official recommendations of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) warned of the much higher likelihood for contraction and outbreak of
infectious disease, and describe the various methods of prevention and protection in
such a disaster setting (EPA “Flood Water Health Precautions”, 2005). Due to the
destruction of both the physical water and sanitation infrastructure and the massive
inundations of floodwater, this was a very justified concern.
Much of the water system of the Greater New Orleans Area was completely
wiped out after the storm. In the entire area affected by the hurricane, over 1,200 water
systems and 200 wastewater systems had been affected. Two weeks after the storm,
about 40% of these systems were up and running again; even a full month after the
storm only 85% of the water systems in this area were fully operational. Further, many
of these systems, though they were again functional, were still operating on boil water
notices pending tests as to the quality of the water (Copeland, 2005). In Louisiana
alone, 23% of the drinking water facilities and 29% of the waste-water facilities were
inoperable after the storm, all of which were located within 100 kilometers of the
coastline (Muthuramalingam, 2005). Considering that not the entire area of Louisiana
was affected by the hurricane, these percentages represent an extremely large portion
of the affected area. The impact was severe enough to incur $2.25 billion of damage
(Muthuramalingam, 2005). Direct physical damage and extended power outages
affected both the ability to treat and distribute water throughout the area (Ram et al,
2007). New Orleans specifically took the worst hit on their water and wastewater
systems in the entire storm-affected region. The cities two largest drinking water plants
were completely underwater for at least two weeks after the storm, and even after they
were repaired to allow for flow for fire-fighting, toilet flushing, and showers, they did not
provide potable water for over a month after the storm. The two largest wastewater
treatment plants were also out of commission in the weeks following the storm. In any
city, wastewater plants are put at the lowest point so as not to cause run off into the rest
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of the city; in a city that is already below sea level, these areas are of course the
hardest hit during flooding. Together these two plants serve over 1.8 million customers.
In a congressional report published one month after the storm, officials believed that
these two systems would need extensive repairs (Copeland, 2005). Estimates by
Louisiana public officials declared that 50% of existing treatment plants and 20% of
sewage collection systems needed rebuilding (Copeland, 2005). For a population who is
used to the comfort of a faucet in their own home, this sudden termination of water
treatment can be very dangerous to their health. With little concept of the dangers of
this unsanitary water or knowledge of alternative methods sanitation, these
infrastructure deficits will inevitably lead to more negative health effects, and possibly an
outbreak of waterborne infectious disease.
Waterborne infectious diseases were not only a concern due to the physical
destruction of the water and sanitation system infrastructure, but also due to the
massive amounts of floodwater in the city that was directly caused by the failure of the
hurricane protection system and the levees. Though of course hurricanes bring with
them intense rain fall, the drainage system of New Orleans was strong enough to
contain any major flooding simply from the rain fall. The levee system, designed and
constructed by the US Army Corps of Engineers (US ACE), was the ultimate failure
which led to much of the destruction of the city (Seed et al, 2006). The system is a 350mile protective ring of levees, flood walls, gates, and pumps (Schwartz, 2010). During
the hurricane and subsequent storm surges, the levees were breached in 50 different
places. Forty-six of these breaches were due to storm surges that were simply too tall
and overtopped the levees. Four of these breaches were due to actual structural flaws
in the foundations of the levees (NPR, 2006). In 2006, two reports were published that
revealed the flaws in the levee system; one was published by the US ACE themselves,
and another was published by University of California at Berkeley and funded by the
National Science Foundation. Both reports declared that the system was “a system in
name only”, with unfinished sections, outdated structures, and lack of coordination both
in design and maintenance (NPR, 2006). According to these reports, the levee system
had a long history of disorganization and inefficiency. The project was begun over 40
years before and was not projected to be completely finished until 2015; as a
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consequence of this, there were several parts left unfinished or not built high enough to
withstand the storm surges. Additionally, throughout the history of the levee system, the
US ACE had many opportunities to update the technology, especially in 1979 when the
entire system was up for review. Despite the fact that the definitions and parameters of
storms were outdated at the time of this review, the US ACE did not make any upgrades
to the system (NPR, 2006). Many of these failures were simply due to a lack in funding:
as other governmental organizations, the budget for the US ACE is constantly under
review, and budget choices must be made. Further, the local government is expected to
foot 30% of the bill for each US ACE project, and these budget decisions come to vote
annually in these local governments as well (NPR, 2006). It was negligence and
ignorance that created a problem that cost thousands of lives. Another major problem
with the levee system was the method of governance. Some of the levees were
controlled and maintained solely by the US ACE, but the rest of them were maintained
by several different levee boards that lacked any common governance. Additionally,
there is an entirely separate system that manages the water pumps for the drainage of
the city, the Water and Sewage Board. With each entity having its own agenda, this lack
of governance made it very difficult to effectively govern and maintain the levee and
drainage system of the city (NPR, 2006). For a major metropolitan area, this is
unacceptable. Frankly, it was negligence and laziness of both the federal and local
governments that cost almost two thousand lives. The waterborne infectious disease
dangers that come with the flood waters are huge as well: flood waters are inevitably
contaminated with raw sewage, which can be a threat to health if individuals drink it or if
it comes into contact with untreated wounds (Muthuramalingam, 2005). The
catastrophic consequences of Hurricane Katrina left New Orleans with water
everywhere, but not a drop to drink.
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Response
The response to Hurricane Katrina was a multi-faceted collaboration of both
local, state, and federal governments. The remediation of the water crisis made up only
one portion of the overall response, with three major steps in the process: the
dewatering of the city, the provision of clean water to victims confined to the disaster
area, and the physical reparation of infrastructure to allow continued function of the
water and wastewater systems. The primary responders to the water crisis were the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the US ACE, and the Sewerage and Water
Board of New Orleans (SWBNO).
The first order of business, before any more advancements could be made, was
to remove the actual floodwaters from the city streets. Their actions immediately poststorm included a de-watering of the city, or a removal of floodwater to protect public
health. As previously mentioned, floodwaters are inevitably contaminated and pose a
threat to the health of the public; additionally, the presence of these floodwaters was
making it nearly impossible many other parts of the relief effort to take action. Skimming
booms were employed to remove oil and debris from the floodwaters before pumping
the clean water into Lake Ponchartrain, the large lake that borders the north shore of
New Orleans (EPA “Hurricane Katrina Response”, 2010).
The second task is to provide clean drinking water options to those still confined
to the affected areas. The EPA responded to this immediate need for clean drinking
water with mobile response systems (Muthuramalingam, 2005), and as early as August
30, the day after the storm, Water Division Assistance Teams had been deployed to
restore the systems and to deliver safe drinking water to the affected areas (EPA
“Hurricane Katrina Response”, 2010). Boil water notices were also issued by the EPA
all across the affected areas (EPA “Hurricane Katrina Response”, 2010). To distribute
this information, the EPA used informational handouts and Public Service
Announcements (PSAs); however, in the immediate aftermath of the storm, lack of
electricity and internet access made distribution of this information very difficult. Further,
power lines and natural gas disruption often made such orders impossible to carry out
(Pavani et al, 2005). Overall, the effectiveness of such awareness campaign methods is
questionable.
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The physical reparation of the water and sanitation infrastructure is the final step
in the water crisis response process. These repairs took place in the days and weeks
after the storm. With the repair of electricity, power lines, and natural gas distribution
systems, much of the infrastructure was back up and running. The SWBNO was in
charge of many of the immediate repairs of the water and wastewater system. In the
days following the storm, SWBNO worked with FEMA to repair the damages to the
physical infrastructure. This fall, SWBNO published a report outlining their work in the
five years since Katrina, including their emergency response. On August 30, only one
day after the storm, SWBNO sent staff to Baton Rouge to obtain diesel fuel to run the
water treatment plant in Algiers and to secure cement to prevent flooding of the the
crucial electric generator that runs many of their plants. On August 31, SWBNO
contacted General Electric (GE) to assist in emergency repair of drainage pumps and
power plant turbines, with work beginning as early as September 3. Also by September
3, over 350 employees and their families had returned to the city to provide services at
pump stations, sewer plants, and water treatment plants all of the city. The SWBNO
used Harrell Park, an area near the Carollton Water Plant, to house many of their
employees and their families so that they could return to the New Orleans to work
despite the fact that their houses had been destroyed in the storm. By October 16, they
had restored primary treatment at the East Bank Waste Water Treatment Plant, one of
the major plants destroyed in the storm; one month later, they had fully restored the
plant (SWBNO, 2010). Despite the fact that SWBNO sprung into action very quickly, yet
it still took almost 2 months for them to restore some of their major water and
wastewater treatment plants. It is important both to understand what they did that was
effective, and how they could better design their system to evade such widespread
destruction in the first place.
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Outcomes
The response, which focused on those three specific steps of the relief process,
was lacking in many ways, despite the fact that it was overall a relative success.
Though the waterborne infectious diseases never became the greatly feared and talked
about epidemics, New Orleans still has a long way to come on their water crisis disaster
response. According to one study conducted approximately one month after the
hurricane which interviewed respondents from eight communities which had boil water
orders instituted, only 31% were aware of the orders. Only 42% of that group and 5%
overall reported boiling their water. Further, only 27% were aware of alternate forms of
water disinfection, such as chlorination, despite the fact that 87% had a container of
chlorine bleach at home (Pavani et al, 2005). These figures are appalling: in a region of
one of the richest countries in the world that is an annual victim of the hurricane season,
the importance of boil water orders and alternative methods of water disinfection should
be common knowledge. Though most of these residents do spend the majority of their
lives living in relative comfort, the danger of their surroundings is a very real threat, and
it should not go ignored.
Though there was a demonstrated increase in waterborne diseases in the area
immediately post-Katrina, these infectious diseases never exploded into the epidemics
that the public health community feared. In one study from the Mortality and Morbidity
Weekly Report (MMWR), the CDC received reports of diarrhoeal disease from
evacuation centers in four affected states: Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and
Texas. Among survivors in these evacuation centers, 20 clusters of outbreak were
reported and investigated, surpassing the previously mentioned annual national
average in a very confined area in a matter of a few short weeks. The 1,000 cases of
diarrhoeal diseases that comprised these 20 outbreaks included norovirus, Salmonella,
and nontoxigenic Vibrio cholerae, and several other types of gastrointestinal illnesses.
Within three weeks of the hurricane, the diarrhoeal disease ceased (MMWR “Infectious
Disease and Dermatologic Conditions”, 2005). Another report from MMWR described a
total of 18 cases of Vibrio illness, an infection contracted from contaminated flood and
drinking waters; five of those infected with Vibrio died (MMWR “Vibrio Illness After
Hurricane Katrina”, 2005) (See Appendix II).
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However, despite the fact that these figures did represent an increase from the
annual average rates from previous years, there were no significant outbreaks or major
increase in mortality or morbidity solely related to an outbreak of infectious disease.
Their response was inadequate, as evidenced by how little the communities knew about
the boil water orders and methods of water sanitation; relative the resources available to
this city, these results are appalling. New Orleans has the fortune of being a part of one
of the world’s most industrialized nations; the United States had many resources, both
human and monetary, to respond to such a disaster. Though the federal and national
response left much of the population of New Orleans wanting much more, it was still
effective enough to curb any major outbreaks of infectious disease.

Malam 18

Preparedness
In a disaster prone region such as New Orleans, lack of preparedness and
inadequacy of disaster response has no excuse. In its 288 years of existence, New
Orleans has experienced 27 major hurricanes, an average of once every eleven years;
climate change has exacerbated both the frequency and intensity of these storms in
recent years (Kates et al, 2006). In the past half a century, the city has been destroyed
twice by hurricanes: Hurricane Betsy in 1965 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Schwartz,
2010). Additionally, over the past century, a major, debilitating flood has occurred once
every 30 to 50 years (Bea, 2006). Further, hurricanes present themselves with several
days warning; Katrina formed as a tropical depression on August 23, almost a week
before it hit the gulf coast (Knabb et al, 2006). Many residents had the opportunity to
prepare for the disaster by evacuating; even those who did not evacuate had time to
buy bottled water in anticipation of impaired drinking water facilities. The governments
had ample time to distribute and disseminate important information for the health of the
public. Yet, overall, prevention, preparedness, and response all failed.
In 1965, New Orleans was similarly destroyed by Hurricane Betsy. Professor
Robert Bea, who was living and working in New Orleans at the time, has lamented that
he and his family lost their home and all their possessions, including their wedding
photos. Further, there were many plans for improvement after this storm as well, and he
says that “if everything that was authorized following Hurricane Betsy had been in place
and worked, we would have had a few missing shingles, broken glass, and tree limbs not a devastated city” (Bea, 2010). Fifty years later, Hurricane Katrina did devastate the
city, now giving it another chance to provide adequate flood protection to its inhabitants.
Improvements have been made since this disaster to better prepare New
Orleans for future disasters; however, some still say that it is not enough. In an article
published in August 2010, 5 years after the storm, the New York Times reports on the
status of the improved levee system, due to be complete by the beginning of the 2011
hurricane season, beginning in June. Many of the fundamental designs of the levees
have changed: where before many were built on mud and shell that was eroded by the
storm, the foundations are now reinforced with clay, a substance that is much more
difficult to erode. Further, the shape of the levees have changed; they are now shaped
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like inverted T’s, braced with pilings driven deep into the ground, and built on cement
mixed with soil. The system is now designed to withstand the type of storm that is
predicted to form once every 500 years, whereas before it was designed for a storm that
is predicted to form once a century (Schwartz, 2010). Clearly, the system is
strengthening for the better. Additional improvements have been made with the
governance of the levee system. There is now a somewhat consolidated levee board,
created to remediate the mistakes of these previously un-unified entities (Schwartz,
2010). However, many experts still believe that though the governance system has
improved, it still may not be unified enough to allow for the necessary maintenance of
the system (Bea, 2010). Finally, the pump systems have been strengthened as well to
withstand more flooding. Previously, they were designed only to drain rainfall from the
city streets; now they are larger, stronger, and designed to drain the massive amounts
of water that would come with a levee breaching (Schwartz, 2010).
However, in an interview with a representative from the US ACE, Edward Link
admitted that the strongest parts of the levee system now are those that have been
repaired and that “the system is only as strong as its weakest point” (NPR, 2006). In
other words, despite these improvements the levee system may still not be able to
withstand the next major storm. In fact, many experts believe that even after the
improvements are completed in 2011, the system will still not be strong enough to
protect New Orleans from the massive flooding that comes with a major storm
(Schwartz, 2010). In the same interview, Professor Bea agreed, asserting that an entire
upgrade of the system may still very well be necessary (NPR, 2006). Now, four years
later, Professor Bea still has a similar opinion. Though he does feel at this point that the
system is significantly stronger, “the levels of protection do not match the consequences
of failure”. Yes, the protection is now adequate enough to protect against another “near
miss” like Katrina, where the eye of the storm passed just east to the center of the city.
The storm veered off that path at the very last minute. If there was a direct hit, or a
storm stronger than Category 3, even with the new and improved levee system, the city
would still be devastated (Bea, 2010). Even with all of these opportunities, the New
Orleans government and public are still sitting back and allowing their city, their water
system, and their well being to be destroyed every few decades.
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Additionally, the SWBNO has made many major improvements to the pumping
system, the water and wastewater sanitation system. Millions of dollars have been
spent on repairs to the infrastructure damaged during such a disaster, such as the Old
Carrollton Water Pumping Station, the Central Yard Annex Station, repairs on the
Fluidized Bed Incinerator for treating sewage, rehabilitation of the East Bank Sewage
Treatment Plant, the replacement the Michoud and Lamb Sewage Pumping Stations,
and miscellaneous water leak and electrical repairs (SWBNO, 2010). In addition to the
basic repairs that were made on the damaged infrastructure, other actions have been
taken to better prepare the system to withstand such a disaster. A system of emergency
bypass pumps have been installed, allowing the pumping of water and sewage around
damaged stations in the case of disasters such as Katrina. The US ACE has re-started
a $60 million project to build a concrete box culvert canal along Dwyer Road. This
project would greatly improve drainage in New Orleans East, a particularly low-lying
area of the city where much of the worst flooding occurred. SWBNO has also begun
construction on a $3.5 million, 15 mega watt generator at the Old Carrollton Water
Purification Plant. This generator will improve the capability of operation of the pumping
systems in all types of emergencies, especially in emergencies where the water system
is damaged (SWBNO, 2010). Both the new levee system and the improvements to the
SWBNO system, including the generator, are planned to be completed in 2011
(SWBNO, 2010). This response to “storm-proof” New Orleans is the most aggressive in
the history of the city, and but still may not be enough to withstand the next major storm.
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Conclusion
The ill-preparedness of New Orleans is not an isolated case in the world; it is not
even an isolated case in the United States. In the interview with the experts on levee
design and maintenance, they cite many dam and levee projects across the country that
remain unfinished. They even declare that the Napa Valley region of California, with its
unfinished dam project, is in much greater danger to flood in the next week than New
Orleans (NPR, 2006). In one of the most resource-rich nations in the world, the
protection of our people in these major metropolitan areas goes largely neglected.
Many disaster-prone nations cannot afford the luxuries of the United States, and
most disasters do not offer such advance notice. As mentioned before, disasters such
as hurricanes can offer up to a week of notice, giving the government ample time to
issue evacuation orders, stockpile supplies, and issue other warnings. The public, in
their turn, have the resources to choose whether or not to evacuate, to stockpile fresh
water and food, and to prepare themselves for the disaster. Other disasters, such as
earthquakes, for example, strike with no warning, and it is equally as important to be
prepared to handle such disasters as well. Though today scientists can use
seismometers to study earthquakes after the fact, or even to predict a 4 to 10 year
window that an earthquake might occur in a particular location, these tools do not
provide any concise method of earthquake prediction (Ludwin, 2004). Further, scientists
in some countries assert that animal behavior can be carefully analyzed to predict an
earthquake, but statistical studies have found no correlation (Schaal, 1988). Though of
course it creates a huge advantage to know the exact day or time that a disaster is
going to occur, these regions cannot use this relatively little warning to excuse their lack
of preparedness.
Further, other disaster prone regions of the world have proved that adequate
flood protection is in fact possible. The Netherlands was completely devastated by the
North Sea storm of 1953. Almost the entire nation was flooded, and thousands of lives
were lost. However, since then, they have provided adequate flood defenses for their
people. Today, they have what Professor Bea calls “a flood defense and management
system that is a miracle of social and facilities engineering” (Bea, 2005). This system is
meant to provide protection for storms that occur once every millennium or once every
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10,000 years, as opposed to the system in New Orleans which, when remodeled,
should protect against a storm that are projected occur once every 500 years. Now,
their unique history and culture are preserved and no longer at danger to imminent
destruction during the annual hurricane season, as New Orleans still is. Professor Bea
states that such protection for New Orleans would cost in excess of $100 billion and
would have to be completed over the course of 50 years or more, but it will be worth it if
executed correctly (Bea, 2007).
The disaster-prone areas of the world know well that they are just that, and it is
absolutely vital to enhance awareness of these regions of the consequences of largescale disasters on the water supply, and water disinfection strategies such as boiling
and chlorination, to protect the health of the public in the aftermath of such disasters
(Pavani et al, 2006). The flood protection system cannot be inadequate. Professor Bea
defines adequate flood protection as “the degree of protection matches the potential
consequences of failure of that protection.” He understands that this means that not all
parts of the city can be protected; this must be acknowledged by the governments and
the public, and policies and plans must be adjusted accordingly. The major failures of
the water system and infrastructure in New Orleans were organizational and technical.
Though it was a natural storm, the disaster itself was man made (Bea, 2010).
Hurricane Katrina was a horrible catastrophe from which the city of New Orleans
and the Gulf Coast is still recovering; yet, as horrible as it was, they were lucky in some
ways. They had the opportunity to evacuate. They had the opportunity to prepare. Most
importantly, they had the richest country in the world to call upon for its recovery. Most
disaster prone areas of the world do not have such luxuries, and in these less
developed regions the consequences are significantly worse.
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Haiti: Earthquake, 2010
In contrast, the victims of the earthquake in Haiti were not so lucky. In an article
published only days after the earthquake, a doctor from Temple University who led relief
efforts in both New Orleans and Haiti compared the two disasters. Dr. Paul Lyons
explained, “The two disasters share some similarities, in that both took out most of the
infrastructure of an entire city... but Port-au-Prince is at least eight times larger and
incomparably poorer than New Orleans... Regardless of what you think about our
response in New Orleans, it’s very clear that our ability to respond was infinitely larger
than Haiti’s government’s ability to respond (Smith, 2010)”. Places like Haiti are a prime
example for the need of such prevention measures: a disaster-prone area that does not
have the financial, physical, or human infrastructure to respond to such devastation.
To further contrast the two disasters, it is important to understand the health and
water status of Haiti before this disaster as well. Haiti provides water coverage for
approximately 55% of the population and sanitation coverage for approximately 30%, as
opposed to the 100% in both categories of the United States. Additionally, the average
Haitian uses approximately 12 liters of water per day, far below the water poverty
threshold, and appalling when compared to the over 600 liters per day of the United
States (Human Development Report, 2006). The infrastructure for the system is
virtually nonexistent. There is no single water ministry; the responsibility for providing
water is spread among the ministries of agriculture, public health, and public works
(Guy, 2004). It is very difficult to manage a system like this with no one who is officially
in charge of the system or fully invested in it. For a system as vitally important as the
national water system, the management must be remodeled. There are two
government-owned water services: Centrale Autonome Metropolitaine d’Eau Potable
(CAMEP), responsible for providing water in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, and
the Service National d’Eau Potable (SNEP), responsible for providing water on the
national level. However, only between 20-30% of the Port-au-Prince population is
covered by CAMEP, and only between 16-24% of the national population is covered by
SNEP. Additionally, a lack of regulations does not ensure that this water is of high
quality or even potable. Since 1997, there has been a proposal circulating through the
Haitian government to create a Ministry of Water and Environment. This would be a
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huge step in the progress of Haiti’s water system; however, even once that was passed,
it would still be millions of dollars that Haiti does not have before any effective
infrastructure could be implemented (Guy, 2004).
Further, the status of infectious disease as a public health concern was
drastically different. From studies conducted by the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO), a regional office of the WHO, diarrhea is the second leading cause of death in
Haiti (PAHO “Health Situation Analysis and Trends Study”, 2010). According to the
CDC, studies have shown that diarrhoeal diseases account for up to 16% of deaths in
Haiti, with an average of 4-6 episodes per child per year across the country (CDC “Haiti
Pre-decision Brief”, 2010). Shigella is highly endemic in Haiti and is the most common
cause of bloody diarrhea; according to a study by the CDC, 5% of children under 5
years of age experienced bloody diarrhea in the preceding two weeks (CDC “Haiti Predecision Brief”, 2010). Leptospirosis and typhoid fever are also considered endemic in
Haiti (CDC “Haiti Pre-decision Brief”, 2010). Compared the United States, where these
waterborne infectious diseases are no longer considered to be a public health concern,
Haiti was in a much more dire situation long before the earthquake hit the island.
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Disaster
The 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti on January 12, 2010 and lasted about
30 seconds, with several smaller aftershocks ranging from 4.2 to 5.9 magnitude in
strength. The epicenter was about 10 miles from Haiti’s overcrowded capital, Port-auPrince, with a population of approximately two million. Approximately 250,000 homes
and upwards of 30,000 commercial buildings collapsed. The official death toll was set at
around 230,000, but many officials believe it to be much higher. An additional 300,000
were injured and 1.5 million were displaced (Fox News, 2010). Consider the difference
in the two disasters: Katrina is considered the most devastating natural disaster in
United States history, yet its death toll represents less than 1% of Haiti’s.
Further, though there was much less infrastructure to be destroyed, the
earthquake still had a catastrophic effect on the drinking water status of Haiti. After the
earthquake, there was no plumbing left underneath Port-Au-Prince, and many of the
water tanks and toilets were also destroyed (Valcárcel, 2010). According to a map
published by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), of the
27 major water tanks in Port-au-Prince, 17 were inoperable, and the remaining 10 were
either operable or unassessed. In other words, a minimum of 63% of the water and
wastewater infrastructure was inoperable immediately after the earthquake (Mattison et
al, 2010). In a country where, on the best of days, sanitary drinking water is hard to
come by, this could have catastrophic effects.
Similar to the media post-Katrina, countless news articles published in the days,
weeks, and months after the earthquake once again cite the concern of waterborne
infectious diseases. In one report from the National Institute of Health, experts
discussed the role of waterborne infectious diseases after the earthquake. Of course,
with a disaster such as an earthquake, the most significant issues are physical trauma
and crush injuries; however, after the first few days, the most significant problem
becomes the infectious diseases associated with the lack of clean water. Especially in a
situation like Haiti, where the earthquake led to such massive population displacement
and overcrowding in make-shift camps, the risk for outbreaks becomes a serious
concern (NIH “Special Report”, 2010). Another article expressed the struggles of Haiti in
comparison to a developed country: “In developed nations, there are plenty of water
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stores and portable bathroom units that can be easily brought in to help during a natural
disaster. In a place like Haiti, where the airport is small, the roads have been severely
damage, and the port is semi-operational, bringing in water and hygiene supplies is
going to be difficult” (Najera, 2010). Further, there was even more concern as the rainy
season approached. In an article published in the Lancet two months after the
earthquake, the public health community’s concerns are very clearly expressed. “The
rainy season poses a big risk for the camps, and we’re particularly concerned about
outbreaks of diarrhea due to fecal contamination of the water supply,” said Stefan
Wiktor, the head of the CDC relief effort in Haiti (Adams, 2010).
At the beginning of November, this fear of the rainy season became a reality.
With the imminent threat of Hurricane Tomas, predicted to fatally slam the island, the
public and officials in Haiti began to prepare for the worst. Similar to Katrina, Tomas’
path changed at the very last minute, clipping Western Haiti but avoiding the capital.
That is not the say its effects were not deadly and catastrophic; in fact, there were at
least seven deaths attributed directly to the storm, and as it exacerbated the cholera
crisis to be discussed later, many more attributed indirectly (BBC, 2010). Further, the
disaster made the world painfully aware of the fact that still, eleven months after the
earthquake, over 1.3 million Haitians were still living in displacement camps in dismal
conditions. The entire city of Leogane was covered with over 3 meters of water, and in
many of the displacement camps people were left standing ankle deep in water (BBC,
2010). In a matter of a few short weeks, this disaster became two simultaneous
disasters, with catastrophic effects.
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Response
Over 400 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have responded to the crisis
(Fisher, 2010). Sanitation is a number one priority; especially now, as the rainy season
is in full force. The WHO, with their Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) cluster, has
been a major actor in the water response. According to their estimates, their efforts
have reached 1.72 million Haitians affected by the earthquake. At least 5 liters of safe
drinking water per person per day is being delivered to 1.2 million people; though this
still falls far below the UN estimate for minimum daily water intake, it is a major
improvement for some. The Direction Nationale d’Eau Potable et Assainissement
(DINEPA), the water and sanitation authority, requested several tons of granulated
chlorine immediately after the earthquake, to disinfect drinking water for survivors. The
fact that the major airport and port city had been completely destroyed made it very
difficult to supply this granulated chlorine, created some serious obstacles for a supply
that is usually very easy to obtain. Collaboration with the International Development
Bank (IDB) and the water and sanitation utility that serves the Dominican Republic,
however, allowed them to find a reasonably priced supplier in the Dominican Republic
and provided trucks to bring the chlorine across the border. The IDB has, among other
equipment, also helped provide large, collapsable water tanks to store water at
emergency distribution points, and conducted a thorough assessment of the damages
to the water and sanitation system (IDB, 2010). The WASH cluster has also been
responsible for running several training programs for Hygiene Promoters, training a total
of 2,200 Hygiene Promoters; significant progress against their initial goal of 2,600
(Fisher, 2010). They have achieved their initial goal in constructing over 11,000 toilets,
with 33,000 total toilets projected. They have, however, encountered many obstacles,
such as ensuring consistent water quality, a lack of space for construction of sanitation
services; landowners that do not allow construction; land that is concreted in that does
not allow construction, and constantly migrating populations so the number of
permanent residents are unclear (Fisher, 2010).
The construction of the latrines, though it went relatively quickly, is posing other
issues as well. A sludge truck arrives daily to pick up the waste from the camps.
However, there is really only one dumpsite in Port-au-Prince for disposal of the waste
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called Trutier. The dump has four separate areas, for trash, rubble, excreta, and
biomedical waste, but since the earthquake the area for excreta is not nearly big
enough because all the sludge trucks are forced to empty here. Especially now, with
displacement camps springing up in all the outskirts of the city, there is even less space
for new landfills. Due to lack of space, some trucks have begun dumping illegally into
rivers and canals (Valcárcel, 2010). These actions, if not corrected, will have
catastrophic effects on waterborne infectious diseases.
Additionally, in anticipation of the rainy season and increased vulnerability for
waterborne infectious diseases, the WHO, in collaboration with UNICEF and the Haitian
Ministry of Health, lead a massive vaccination campaign in the affected areas. The
campaign, which began in mid-February, had reached 900,000 Haitians by May, and is
one of the major successes of the disaster response (PAHO “Nine Months After”, 2010).
The campaign vaccinated against many diarrhoeal diseases, among others such as
measles (UNIFEM, 2010). They did not, however, vaccinate against cholera. According
to the WHO, cholera vaccines are only effective in very specific circumstances. The
vaccine is an orally administered, two dose vaccine with the second does between 1
and 6 weeks after the first. If there is known to be cholera in the area, periodic
preemptive vaccination campaigns for at risk populations can be very effective. They
are not proven to be effective mid-outbreak, and can often provide a false sense of
security and actually contribute to higher rates of transmission. As cholera had not
been present in Haiti since the 1950s, it was not seen as a threat and therefore not a
part of the massive vaccination campaign after the earthquake. Additionally, as it is not
proven to be effective mid-outbreak, there was no campaign after the outbreak had
begun either (PAHO “Position on Cholera Vaccination in Haiti”, 2010). These efforts
have been effective in containing most major outbreaks of disease; however, one of the
most deadly did of course break through.
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Outcomes
Though there was again a demonstrated increase in the burden of disease, for
many months, most waterborne infectious diseases did not explode into epidemics as
promised. Two new surveillance systems put into action after the earthquake showed
no major outbreaks of disease (Fox, 2010), though this is hard to support as there was
no surveillance systems in place before the earthquake. Without concrete statistics to
compare, it is impossible to confidently assert that there have been no outbreaks. There
has been significant mortality and morbidity due to waterborne infectious diseases;
however, how it compares to the conditions before the earthquake is hard to say.
According to the WHO, diarrhoeal illnesses are the third leading cause of illness and
death in the toll of 230,000, falling behind physical trauma and respiratory infections
from dust and mold in the air post-earthquake (Bayard, 2010). For many months, even
though waterborne infectious diseases remained a significant contribution to the overall
burden of disease, all major epidemics were contained.
However, in late October of this year, the post-disaster infectious disease
nightmare became a reality with a vicious outbreak of cholera in disaster-struck Haiti.
Immediately after the earthquake, though infectious diseases were ranked as a high
concern, cholera was not given the highest priority because the disease had not been
present in Haiti since 1950 (CDC “Haiti Pre-decision Brief”, 2010). Though this is not
something that could have been anticipated and fixed by the initial response, it is a lack
in preparedness that allowed the water system and infrastructure of Haiti to be
destroyed to the extent to let cholera back into the nation. Yet in late October, health
officials in both Haiti and the United States confirmed that there had indeed been an
outbreak of cholera in Haiti (Gay, 2010). The epidemic began in Artibonite, a suburb of
Port-au-Prince. As of November 22, the most current statistics cite a death toll of 1,523
with 27,933 other hospitalized cases, with hundreds more that remain unhospitalized.
The mortality rate for the disease is 7.5% (PAHO “Haiti Emergency”, 2010). The
disease is also present in seven of the ten provinces (PAHO “Health Cluster Bulletin”,
2010). For a few weeks, officials believed that they were on their way to containing the
epidemic, yet the number has continued to increase.
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The national response strategy of the Haitian Ministry of Health in association
with WHO/PAHO for the cholera epidemic involved protection of the families in the
community, reinforcement of the 80 primary health care centers in the Metropolitan
Area, and management of severe cases in hospitals. The plan projected about 100,000
cases in need of services in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, and about 200,000
total in the country (“National Epidemic Response Strategy”, 2010). Once again,
vaccination was not seen as an effective option for prevention, and was therefore not
included in the strategy. PAHO is also using a widespread education campaign to help
prevent the spread of cholera. PAHO has sent over 2 million SMS messages to
residents in the Artibonite/Port-au-Prince area providing people with basic but lifesaving information. They plan to send an additional 2 million over the course of the
coming weeks (PAHO “Health Cluster Bulletin”, 2010). They have also distributed
posters and pamphlets and hosted educational sessions throughout Port-au-Prince with
specific attention to the displacement camps (PAHO “Haiti Emergency”, 2010). There
are fears that if the disease does in fact reach the displacement camps, it would
become impossible to contain (PAHO “Haiti Emergency”, 2010). PAHO has also begun
an educational campaign promoting breast feeding for babies. Organizations such as
PAHO/WHO and the UN promote exclusive breast feeding for the first 6 months of life
anyway, with complementary breast feeding until the age of 2 for nutrition and immune
purposes. During an outbreak such as cholera, breast feeding gives infants and young
children two major advantages. Not only does it boost nutrition and their immune
systems, it also eliminates the need for baby formula which, if made with contaminated
water, will increase the spread of cholera (PAHO “Haiti Emergency”, 2010).
Further, the rainy season did in fact become a major concern with the threat of
Hurricane Tomas, which hit Haiti on the morning of November 5. The hurricane was of
significant concern to public health officials, and for good reason. This could have very
well been the one last hit that would entirely take out the water and sanitation
infrastructure, leaving the displacement camps and the populations living there totally
vulnerable to the threat of cholera (Partners in Health, 2010). Though in some ways, the
Haiti population was lucky in that it was not a direct hit as anticipated, the hurricane has
still had catastrophic effects on the cholera epidemic. In the immediate aftermath of the
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hurricane, officials said the epidemic had increased by 40% (BBC, 2010), and since
then it has increased by more than 200% (Reuters, 2010). Hospitalizations and deaths
have both increased drastically since Hurricane Tomas (PAHO “Health Cluster Bulletin”,
2010) (See Appendix II). After dealing with the initial damages from the Hurricane,
which were in fact minimal compared to what had been anticipated, it was absolutely
vital to continue cholera treatment and prevention without hesitation.
Cholera treatment is very simple, if caught early. The disease can be treated by
oral rehydration salts and, in extreme cases, intravenous fluids. In fact, cases of cholera
show up every year in countries all over the world, but the disease does not spread in
the appropriate public health conditions when treatment is available. This disease would
have spread in the conditions in Haiti pre-earthquake as well; in the aftermath of this
disaster, the effects were only exacerbated (PAHO “Haiti Emergency”, 2010). The strain
has been confirmed to resemble that most commonly found in South Asia, putting a UN
base on the Artibonite river that houses Nepalese troops under serious scrutiny, and
causing many Haitians to lose faith in the UN effort overall (New York Times, 2010).
This lack of faith has increased frustration with the earthquake response and has lead to
violence and protests that lead to obstruction of care in many areas (PAHO “Haiti
Emergency”, 2010). Dr Mirta Roses, the director of PAHO, said “Every hour that the
efforts of medical and relief workers are obstructed means more deaths of Haitians from
cholera.” With a fatality rate already above 7%, it is anticipated that with continued
obstruction of care this fatality rate could increase to five times that. Shipments of
medical supplies have arrived, but the airport and many major roads have been closed
due to violence, disrupting distribution of the supplies. Since violence erupted on
November 15, many PAHO staff members have been confined to their living quarters
for almost a week, unable to assist with distribution of supplies, and training and
coordination of health workers in the region (PAHO “Haiti Emergency”, 2010). However,
no organizations have any intention at the time of evacuating their staff to safer territory.
They know that treatment must continue, as consistent and uninterrupted as possible in
order to contain the epidemic. Person to person transmission of the disease is very rare;
for this reason, educational campaigns and drinking water treatment are the most
effective methods prevention and control (PAHO “Haiti Emergency”, 2010).
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Preparedness
Compared to New Orleans and the United States, Haiti does not have the same
luxuries to be prepared for or to respond to these disasters. However, some significant
achievements have been made, both policy- and infrastructure-based. The major policybased achievements made represent huge steps in progress for Haiti. Two surveillance
systems have been put in place to identify and monitor outbreaks of such diseases in
order to better contain them. Two weeks after the earthquake, the CDC implemented
the National Sentinel Site Surveillance System in order to better target relief efforts
through identification and tracking of disease outbreaks. In collaboration with the Haitian
Health Cluster, the CDC also implemented the Internally Displaced Person Surveillance
System, tracking trends in the make-shift camps throughout the country (Infectious
Disease News, 2010). These surveillance systems were helpful in targeting the areas
where relief effort was most necessary; however, they did not give us as much insight
because they were newly implemented after the earthquake. The public health system
of Haiti previously had no method of surveillance. This is clearly a major gap in the
prevention efforts of this disaster-prone area; instead of wasting time and lives while the
data is gathered after the disaster, it is absolutely vital whenever possible to have such
information before. According to the committees that implemented these systems,
“Improving future humanitarian response requires advance development and
distribution of easily adaptable standard surveillance tools, development of an
interdisciplinary strategy for an early and reliable population census, and development
of communication strategies using locally available internet and cellular networks”
(Infectious Disease News, 2010).
Additionally, in response to the earthquake, the government has modified the
National Contingency Plan in case of future emergencies. Primarily, the plan had to be
revised to account for the coming hurricane season and 1.5 million displaced citizens.
A new Emergency Operations Centre has been constructed to replace the one
destroyed by the earthquake; a 24-hour emergency hotline has been established; and
emergency stocks of food, medical supplies, and water have been pre-positioned
throughout the country (Fisher, 2010). These adjustments are major improvements for
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the overall public health system of Haiti; however, had they been in place before the
earthquake, the impact of the earthquake could have been significantly mitigated.
An interview with Mr John Coo, the head of Green Cross International’s Canada
branch, revealed one of the many ways international NGOs are attempting to build back
the water infrastructure in Haiti in a sustainable, disaster-resistant fashion. His
organization has appealed for funding and has begun to implement a program of
“biosand” filters in Haiti, as both a short-term and long-term response (See Appendix
III). The biosand filters are a very efficient and low-cost technology that could be a very
good medium- to long-term solution for a country like Haiti (Coo “Interview”, 2010). A
93% decrease in waterborne diseases and a 40% decrease in diarrhoeal diseases have
been associated with use of this technology. These filters removed 95-99% of organic
contaminants such as bacteria, viruses, protozoa, worms, and particles, and inorganic
contaminants such as arsenic and mercury. They cost about $100 each to construct,
deliver, and install (Coo “Green Cross Appeal for Haiti”, 2010).
Mr Coo sees this disaster as a potential chance to build back a more efficient and
effective water system in Haiti, but before this can happen the disaster responses must
be better adapted to be more sustainable in a nation like Haiti. The normal water
response in disasters such as this is reverse-osmosis, which is not a sustainable
method of water purification. For a nation that had severely lacking water services
before the disaster, these methods are especially unsustainable. It is a complex method
that involves bagging and trucking the water. This is not a sustainable method of water
provision for a developing country like Haiti. For an industrialized country, this is a more
sustainable disaster response because the infrastructure for permanent water provision
already exists and can usually be rebuilt in a reasonable amount of time (Coo
“Interview”, 2010).
According to Mr Coo, one solution to make the Haitian water system more
resilient in future disasters is to have independent, local water provision and purification.
“If a storm washes out local roads, or knocks down power lines or destroys 50% of the
buildings, the other 50% will still be able to treat their water” (Coo “Interview”, 2010).
This is true of any disaster- or conflict-prone region, Coo says. In these types of
situations, interdependence makes them very vulnerable; local; independent systems
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makes them resilient. The biosand filters are a very effective technology that should be
part of the permanent solution, but not the only part of the permanent solution. They can
be locally made with 95% local materials, with very minimal training and manufacturing
facilities; in this way, this method can help jump start and sustain the local economy.
According to Coo, a proper well is a better permanent solution, but these are very easily
contaminated after a disaster. These biosand filters, if installed in the majority of
households, can provide clean, drinkable water for any one that has the ability to draw
water or even collect rainwater, which can sometimes need treatment. “Yes, this is an
opportunity to build back a more effective water system, and maybe more efficient...
however we must try to avoid being drawn into defining efficiency solely in terms of lowcost. Resilience has to be factored into the equation” (Coo “Interview”, 2010). There are
many choices for disaster response and reconstruction of the water infrastructure in
Haiti, and the biosand filters may be the most sustainable and resilient for the purposes
of Haiti.
Haiti is a very different case than New Orleans because, though they have long
been aware that they are a disaster-prone region of the world, they have never had the
resources to address these problems. Of course they were aware of their lacking water
and sanitation infrastructure, but “if they are living hand-to-mouth even in good times,
they are not going be investing in preventative measures” (Coo “Interview”, 2010). Its
difficult to begin development projects in areas such as this, when the government can
provide little to no funding, and sporadic funding from the general public and other
governments. Though this funding is always appreciated, it is very hard to convince
reactionary populations like this to fund preventative measures. Other funders, like
international development institutions and foundations, will fund research and
preventative measures. However, both types of funding will be necessary to totally
revamp the water and wastewater infrastructure of Haiti to make it more resilient and
sustainable in future disasters, something that is proving absolutely necessary with the
evidence of the recent cholera outbreak (Coo “Interview”, 2010). The world cannot
stand by when such changes in disaster preparedness and prevention can be made so
easily and at so little cost to the general public.
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Conclusion
Haiti has a long history of being vulnerable in almost every way. They are prone
to disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes, they have a history of unstable
governments that do not look out for the best interests of their people, and are plagued
with infectious diseases, high infant, under five, and maternal mortality rates. They are
one of the poorest nations in the world; most residents of the United States or other
developed countries could not even begin to fathom the dimensions of the poverty in
this country. Much more so than New Orleans, Haiti has somewhat of an excuse for
their lack of disaster-preparedness; most people in this country can barely muster
together the resources for day-to-day life, much less expensive preventative measures
which they may never truly see the results from.
However, as with the comparison of New Orleans and the Netherlands, we know
that comprehensive earthquake protection is in fact possible, with the example of
Japan. A mere month and a half after the earthquake in Haiti, an earthquake with a
magnitude between 6.9 and 7.3 struck Japan which caused no major damage (Weiss,
2010). The earthquake in Haiti, of the same magnitude, killed hundreds of thousands of
people and the country is still feeling the effects from it, and will be for a long time.
Japan, like Haiti, is an earthquake-prone country, with 20% of the world’s earthquakes
with a magnitude of 6 or greater occurring near or in Japan (Weiss, 2010). However,
their buildings are constructed in accordance with a strict earthquake code, with
expensive materials such as the rubber-based elastomeric isolators, a material that
was, ironically, discovered on Hispaniola, the island that Haiti shares with the Domincan
Republic (Häne, 2010).
Experts acknowledge that there is no way that Haiti, on its own, would be able to
afford such expensive technological changes. However, as Haiti is building back their
cities, there are some very simple principles they can follow that will increase the
structural integrity of the houses. However, experts also acknowledge that the Haiti
government is so troubled with corruption and instability that even if these building
codes were to exist, there would be no effective way of enforcing them. If this is seen as
a specific aim in the reconstruction of these cities, the new city will be more prepared to
handle a disaster such as this in the future (Häne, 2010). Unfortunately, however, it is
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unlikely that Haiti will ever be as earthquake-resistant as Japan. Foreign and outside
donations can only do so much; without internal resources and internal motivation,
these policies will have little to no effect.
John Coo encapsulated the need to focus on disaster preparedness in Haiti as a
method to pull it out of poverty once and for all.:
“It will be a huge job, but yes, proper preparedness, response and rebuilding can
help pull Haiti out of poverty. When people live on the margins, as so many in Haiti do,
they are vulnerable in every way. Their daily life is precarious - flimsy shelters and food
and water systems that are easily destroyed by natural disasters - even minor ones.
This, coupled with their marginal economic existence means that any set-back can be
devastating and undo years of trying to pull themselves up out of poverty. And then
they have to go back to subsistence living. If that happens a couple of times to
someone they may just give up on the idea of trying to elevate themselves, saving and
building a business, because it will just be swept away again by the elements, fate or
government. They have to believe that working hard to improve their lot will have a
long-term benefit” (Coo “Interview, 2010).
The vicious cycle linking environment, poverty, and health has Haiti in its clutches.
International collaboration is absolutely necessary to focus on the disaster
preparedness of this region of the world, as they lack their own resources to help
themselves. To improve the public health and prosperity of this nation, it is absolutely
vital to help Haiti break free from this vicious cycle of periodic destruction by natural
disasters. The technology is available; currently, the resources are not. However, in our
increasingly global community, it is nothing short of irresponsible to let an area of our
world be periodically destroyed and ravaged by disease when the technology is
available to stop it.
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Conclusion
This examination of the preventative measures, responses, and results of these
two disasters, reveals many implications for the future. The richest and the poorest
countries in the world each experienced their respective worst disasters; however, both
are regions that experience such disasters quite often. There is little excuse for them to
be so ill-prepared to handle such disasters. The responses to Hurricane Katrina was
enough to curb any significant outbreaks or epidemics of infectious disease; however,
these responses were costly and after-the-fact. The response to the earthquake in Haiti,
though well-organized and well-financed, could not stop these outbreaks; as a result,
more than 1,500 people have already died, with almost 30,000 hospitalized from the
outbreak of a single disease. Neither country, developed nor developing, employed any
effective preventative or preparedness measures to reduce the impact of the disaster
from the very beginning. One report from the National Institute of Health, published in
the Canadian Medical Association Journal in 2008, warns of the need for preventative
measures regarding infectious diseases and natural disasters. North America is
expected to experience marked changes in weather patterns in the next few decades,
including a much higher frequency of extreme weather events, and the incidence of
waterborne infectious diseases is expected to increase dramatically as a result of this
climate change. In developing countries, the increase in the burden of disease is
expected to be much more significant; however, according to the report, “the fact that
infectious diseases do not respect national borders highlight the need for multinational
and collaborative scientific efforts to control disease”(Greer et al, 2008). While of
course we must try to modify our behaviors to impede the onset of climate change, that
cannot be our only method of prevention against these coming changes. Disasterprone areas must strengthen their public health infrastructure regarding disease
surveillance, food and water safety, outbreak response, and physical water, wastewater,
and disaster protection infrastructure (Greer et al, 2008). On a humanitarian level,
these methods of prevention and preparedness can save thousands of lives in
mitigating the immediate effects and consequences of such natural disasters. Once
again, as Professor Bea said: “There are no Natural Disasters” (Bea, 2010). There are
the disaster prone regions of the world, and there is human action, reaction, and lack
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there of. “Mieux vaut prévenir que guérir”; this proverb is true on an individual level, a
community level, and a global level. International collaboration and innovation for
prevention and preparedness is now more important than ever before. We cannot
control the disasters; we can begin to control the damages with our disaster prevention,
preparedness, and response.
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Appendix I
Theory of Prudent Investment in Prevention - Professor Robert Bea, PhD.

Source: Personal Files of Professor Robert Bea, PhD.
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Appendix II
Selected Diseases and Conditions reported in Hurricane Katrina evacuees and
rescuers in the 3 weeks immediately after the storm

Source: “Infectious Disease and Dermatologic Conditions in Evacuees and Rescue
Workers After Hurricane Katrina.” Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report. 26 September
2005.
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Appendix III
Cholera hospitalizations and deaths between October 20 and November 14 - both
increasing drastically in the days after Hurricane Tomas, November 5

Source: “Health Cluster Bulletin - Cholera Outbreak in Haiti - #2.” Pan American Health
Organization. November 16 2010.
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Appendix IV
Biosand filter used by Green Cross International - Canada in their response in
Haiti

The biosand filter is a very low-cost, efficient technology that has existed for decades for
people who live in areas with no access to naturally safe or treated water. Fine and
coarse sand and gravel are layered in either a concrete or plastic barrel. Contaminated
and untreated water from rain, surface, or ground surfaces is poured through the filter,
passing through a plate that diffuses the stream and blocks large contaminants. The
water is then collected in a PVC collection pipe. These filters remove between 95-99%
of organic contaminants and can produce between 20 and 60 liters of water per hour,
depending on the size. These filters can reduce the incidence of diarrheal illness by up
to 40% and incidence of waterborne disease by 93%. Maintenance is required, but in
the form of a simple stirring or skimming tool of the top layer of sand in order to remove
any clogging of the sand. They are very easy to use and are already in use in many
households in Haiti.
Source: Coo, John. “Green Cross Appeal for Haiti.” Green Cross Canada. 2010.

Malam 43

Appendix V: Interviews
V.A: Interview with Professor Robert Bea of the University of
California at Berkeley and author of a major review of the levee
system of New Orleans - November 16, 2010
Malam: Please discuss your theory of “prudent investment in prevention.” Are people
too prudent when it comes to investment in prevention, as in do you feel there is not
enough investment in prevention? In the US? Worldwide?
Bea: The 'prudent investment in prevention' (PIP) is a key topic in the work I have done
before, during, and after Katrina. The PIP has two important effects on Risk:
investments can lower the likelihoods (probabilities, Pf) and consequences (Cf) of
'failures'. About 30 years ago, I developed an analytical expression that connects the
invested costs (Ci), Cf, and Pf.
The 'optimum' (minimum total costs) Pfo = 0.4348 / (Cf / delta Ci) x pvf. The 'marginal'
Pfm = 2 Pfo. the 'safe Pfs = 0.5 x Pfo
Delta Ci is the cost required to lower Pf by an order of magnitude.
Pvf is an annual monetary discount. For long life systems, pvf = l / net discount rate.
example if net discount rate is 10% per year, then pvf = 10 years (typical for industrial
commercial systems). If net discount rate is 1 % per year, then pvf = 100 years (typical
for societal systems).
The consequence scale shown below is (Cf / delta Ci) x pvf. The diagram is divided into
two sectors: Fit for Purpose, and Not Fit for Purpose. (See figure above).
If Cf is high, then Pf must be low. if delta Ci is high (initial costs of prevention) are very
high, then Pf must be higher. If the pvf is large, then Pf must be low. The consequence
scale shown below is (Cf / delta Ci) x pvf.
The three lines are Pfs (green), Pfo (orange), and Pfm (red). These three lines describe
the 'legal' ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) region (see second figure
below).
If a system falls in the Not Fit for Purpose sector, then either Pf can be reduced,
Consequences of Failure reduced (e.g. reduce Cf), or a combination. Here is how
deliberations concerning PIP can be focused.
Investments in prevention require a long-term view of the future. The American public
generally seems to be focused on the short-term view. The political process
encourages this view given our short re-election cycles. The commercial - industrial
process also encourages this view given stockholder requirements for immediate
growth and return on investments.
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Flood protection systems require continuous maintenance and improvement. Yet, our
congressional funding process is focused on the Water Resources Development Act
that is addressed every two years. This process is focused on short term projects.
thus, coherent SYSTEMS are not developed, and there are no provisions for long term
developments.
This is not the process used in the Netherlands or Japan for flood - water protection.
M:It is often hard to get any funding or attention for such programs until AFTER the
disaster has hit - why do you think this is the case?
Bea: The American public is clearly 'reactionary'.....this goes back to the days the U.S.
was founded......we must be 'hurt' before we take action to fix the hurt.
M: How do you think this global mentality must change to have a more effective
influence on disaster prevention, preparedness, and response?
Bea: Some changes have begun...largely in parts of Europe....focused on global climate
changes....which are inevitable.....the climate has been changing since there was a
climate to change.....we are beginning to understand and mobilize reactions to what we
understand.
M: Do you feel that New Orleans could have been better prepared to protect against
Hurricane Katrina, both on a general level and specifically relating to the water system?
Bea: Yes. I have said that if everything that was authorized following Hurricane Betsy
had been in place and worked, we would have had a few missing shingles, broken glass
and tree limbs - not a devastated city.
M: What do you think could and should be done in New Orleans to increase the
capacity to prevent destruction of the city?
Bea: Occupy only what can be adequately protected after it has been protected.
Adequate means that the degree of protection matches the potential consequences of
failure of that protection.
M: Why do you think these actions have not been taken?
Bea: The U.S. is not willing to make the necessary short-term and long-term
investments to provide the adequate protection.
M: Has the issue of the Levee boards being separate from the Water & Sewage board
been solved?
Bea: No. The interagency conflicts persist.
M: Is the governance of the levees in any better shape?
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Bea: Some, not a lot. The state failed to provide sufficient funding to support the flood
protection authorities.
M: What must be done and what effect do you think it will have?
Bea: If the city wants adequate flood protection, then the city is going to have to take
responsibility to develop and maintain that protection. This means mobilizing local,
state, and federal support. The city is still in a "throw me something mister" mentality.
M: Do you feel like the state of Louisiana has taken enough responsibility for the
rebuilding of the levees?
Bea: No
M: Is the Louisiana Corps of Engineers now a more significant participant?
Bea: Yes
M: As of June 2006 you said that one year after the storm, though the system is
“fundamentally stronger”, it is not “significantly stronger.” Now, four years later, are you
satisfied with the improvements and changes made on the levees?
Bea: No. The levels of protection do not match the consequences of failure. Thus,
people need to "build high and strong" - rather than depend on the existing flood
protection system.
M: Do you feel like the levee system is significantly stronger?
Bea: Yes.
M: Do you feel that New Orleans would be safe if confronted with another Katrina-sized
storm?
Bea: Yes...if it was a 'near miss' like Katrina. if it was a 'direct hit' with the eye of the
storm passing just to the west of the center of the city (not east as it did during Katrina),
then i am not so sure that the system would be able to withstand a surge in the range of
25 feet with the associated wave action from the Gulf.
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V.B: Interview with Mr John Coo, head of Green Cross International,
Canada Branch - November 14, 2010
Malam: You hope to develop a program that researches these natural disasters in order
to prepare disaster-prone areas of the world to have better prevention and response
methods in the future. In the briefing on “Environmental Disaster Response”, you
mention how due to climate change this is now more important than ever. However, it is
often hard to get any funding or attention for such things until AFTER the disaster has
hit - why do you think this is the case, and how do you think this global mentality must
change to have a more effective influence on disaster prevention, preparedness, and
response? What is Green Cross International doing in particular to change this global
mentality?
Coo: Some funders respond only after a disaster has hit - like the general public and
governments responding to citizen concern. Other funders - like international
development institutions and foundation - are prepared to fund research and
preventative measures. We will need both kinds of funding. One challenge will be to
set up a system to capitalize on public attention about natural disasters, like
humanitarian organizations do.
M: Do you feel that New Orleans could have been better prepared to respond Hurricane
Katrina, both on a general level and specifically relating to the water system? What do
you think could be done in New Orleans and other disaster-prone areas to increase the
capacity to prevent destruction of these water systems or to develop a more timely
response to the destruction of these water systems?
Coo: I have not had the opportunity to study the New Orleans case (that would be part
of phase 1 of my project) but from what I have heard, yes, they could have been better
prepared. They allowed the natural systems that provided buffers and resilience to be
eroded over time (like bayous, swamps). Coastal areas need understand the role of
natural defenses and revisit the changes they have permitted or encouraged to those
natural landscapes to see what must be replanted or built back. Another example of
this is hillside deforestation in Haiti. So they also have to examine how major rainfalls
or flooding will affect run-off and what that run-off will contain. For example, in New
Orleans, when the floodwaters came in, they flooded a bunch of gas and oil storage
facilities and sucked that industrial contamination back out to sea as the waters
receded. It was weeks before anyone was paying any attention to that. But that was an
obvious potential problem and easily predicted.
M: Taking into account Haiti’s history and socioeconomic status, could Haiti have been
more prepared to handle the earthquake, both on a broad level and specifically relating
to the water system? What can be done now to better prepare Haiti for such disasters in
the future?
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Coo: Haiti is a harder case because it never had the resources to address these
problems. The potential problems were obvious enough, but if they are living hand-tomouth even in good times, they are not going to be investing in preventative
measures. In the short and medium term that level of planning and preparedness will
only come from the international community. Given the problems of building large scale
infrastructure in Haiti, one solution to minimizing water problems in future disasters is to
build resilience by having independent, local water provision and purification. For
example, if every house in a village had a water filter like the ones we provide (biosand)
then so long as they can draw water somewhere, they can treat it themselves. If a
storm washes out local roads, or knocks down power lines or destroys 50% of the
buildings, the other 50% will still be able to treat their water. Small scale, locally
housed, non-interdependent systems bring resilience to disaster-prone areas. The
same thing is true in conflict zones. One of the first things military strategists do (after
hitting military targets) is to destroy civic and industrial infrastructure (power generation
and transmission, hydro dams, bridges). So inter-dependence makes them vulnerable.
Local, independent systems (solar power, wind, small-scale water treatment) makes
them resilient.
M: Water-borne infectious diseases were already a major issue in Haiti due to the
inadequate water and sanitation coverage. Do you think the earthquake, with its
widespread destruction of the water system, has given Haiti an opportunity to build it
back a more effective and efficient water system?
Coo: It has laid the problem bare. Ironically, the early response for water provision,
large scale reverse-osmosis plants, has added to the problem, in that the population
has learned to identify that as the best water solution. But reverse-osmosis is
expensive and complex and involves bagging and trucking water, so is not really
sustainable. Now it will be hard to wean people off the ultra-high quality water solutions
they have been receiving. However, many agencies see this problem and are seeking
more sustainable solutions. So yes, there is an opportunity to build back a more
effective water system, and maybe more efficient - well certainly more cost-efficient than
what is going on now. However, we must try to avoid being drawn into defining
efficiency solely in terms of low-cost. Resilience has to be factored into the equation.
M: Is the bio-sand filter initiative projected to be a permanent installation for everyday
use or solely for after disasters? Why is this the most effective method for water filtration
in Haiti? Do you think citizens of Haiti likely use these filtration systems effectively? Is
this method of water disaster response applicable to other disaster-prone regions of the
world, such as New Orleans? What other methods did you consider?
Coo: Yes the biosand filter system is intended to be a medium to long-term solution, but
perhaps not permanent. A proper well is a better permanent solution, but often even
these are contaminated, especially after a disaster. Even rainwater harvested
sometimes needs treatment. So maybe they will be a permanent part of the solution.
The reason they are good for Haiti and many other places is that they can be locally
made, with 95% local materials and minimal training and facilities. Yes Haitians can
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use the filters effectively and have been for many years in many parts of the country
(and in many African countries). Are they a solution for developed countries, like the
US? I am not sure. People are used to municipal water services and will be hesitant to
use low-tech filtration solutions. In most industrialized countries probably short-term,
high-tech solutions are good in a disaster situation and infrastructure can be rebuilt in
reasonable time.
M: Which do you feel is a more cost-effective epidemic-prevention method - a massive
vaccination campaign or a massive water filtration campaign?
Coo: That is beyond my expertise, but I suspect it is very dependent on the specific
situation. And no one in development/humanitarian assistance wants to set up
competing needs - both are important.
M: Do you believe that effective preparedness against disasters could help pull Haiti out
of poverty? Without an annual struggle of recovering from tropical storms and with more
confidence that Haiti would be able to survive a disaster, would Haiti be able to work
more successfully towards sustainability?
Coo: It will be a huge job, but yes, proper preparedness, response and rebuilding can
help pull Haiti out of poverty. When people live on the margins, as so many in Haiti do,
they are vulnerable in every way. Their daily life is precarious - flimsy shelters and food
and water systems that are easily destroyed by natural disasters - even minor ones.
This, coupled with their marginal economic existence means that any set-back can be
devastating and undo years of trying to pull themselves up out of poverty. And then
they have to go back to subsistence living. If that happens a couple of times to
someone they may just give up on the idea of trying to elevate themselves, saving and
building a business, because it will just be swept away again by the elements, fate or
government. They have to believe that working hard to improve their lot will have a
long-term benefit.
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